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The Russian banking sector has experienced enormous growth rates during the last 6-7 
years. The rapid growth of assets has, however, contributed to a decrease in the capital 
adequacy ratio, thus influencing the ability of banks to cope with risk. Using quarterly data 
spanning from 1999 to 2007 on all Russian banks, we investigate the relationship between 
bank characteristics and risk-taking by Russian banks. The analysis of financial ratios re-
veals that, on average, the risk levels are still below those observed in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Combining the group-wise comparisons of financial ratios and the results of insol-
vency risk analysis based on fixed effects vector decomposition, three main conclusions 
emerge. First, controlling for bank characteristics, large banks have higher insolvency risk 
than small ones. Second, foreign-owned banks exhibit higher insolvency risk than domes-
tic banks and large state-controlled banks are, unlike other state-controlled banks, more 
stable. Third, we find that the regional banks engage in significantly more risk-taking than 
their counterparts in Moscow. 
 
JEL Classification: G21, G32, P34 





We are grateful for the valuable comments and suggestions we have received from Stephan Barisitz, Randall Filer,  
Michael Funke, Iftekhar Hasan, Esa Jokivuolle, Iikka Korhonen, Aaron Mehrotra, Tuomas Takalo, Laurent Weill,  
participants of the BOFIT seminar in Helsinki (March 2008), the IX International Academic Conference in Moscow 
(April 2008), the Sixth ESCB Workshop on Emerging Markets in Helsinki (May 2008) and the 10th EACES conference 
in Moscow (August 2008). 
 
Address for correspondence: Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT),  
PO Box 160, FI-00101 Helsinki, Finland 
E-mail: zuzana.fungacova@bof.fi, laura.solanko@bof.fi 
 Zuzana Fungáčová and Laura Solanko  Risk-taking by Russian banks: 








Risk-taking by Russian banks: 






Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan pankkien riskinottoa käyttäen hyväksi neljännesvuosiai-
neistoa, joka kattaa liki kaikki venäläiset liikepankit vuosina 1999-2007. Haemme vastaus-
ta siihen, vaikuttaako koko, omistuspohja tai maantieteellinen sijaintipaikka pankin ris-
kinottoon.  Tuloksemme osoittavat, että suuret pankit ovat alttiimpia ottamaan suhteessa 
suurempia riskejä kuin pienet pankit. Ulkomaalaisomisteisten pankkien vakavaraisuus (z-
score) on alhaisempi kuin muiden pankkien. Suuret valtion kontrolloimat pankit ovat eri-
tyisen vakavaraisia. Lisäksi tuloksemme osoittavat, että alueelliset pankit ottavat suurem-
pia riskejä kuin pääkaupunkiin rekisteröidyt pankit. 
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1  Introduction 
 
Banking sectors in most countries of the Commonwealth of the Independent states (CIS), 
Russia included, have experienced nearly phenomenal growth rates during recent years. As 
a consequence of the dramatically improved macroeconomic situation and important legis-
lative changes, the ratio of banking sector assets in Russian GDP grew annually by more 
than 2 percentage points between 2001 and 2007. This ratio exceeded 60 percent by the 
end of 2007. Simultaneously, bank credit to the private sector has more than doubled to 30 
percent of GDP.  
With the rapid growth of total assets, deposits and loan stocks, Russian banks are 
increasingly assuming their role as financial intermediaries channelling household deposits 
and foreign borrowing into domestic corporate credits. This necessarily causes changes in 
the banks' assets and liability structures, attitudes towards risk-taking and risk manage-
ment. Rapid credit growth is likely to increase (potential) banking sector risks. On the oth-
er hand, the ongoing financial deepening also indicates that the Russian banking sector is 
beginning to have an impact on private sector (both corporate and individual) behaviour 
and investments. That is, banks in Russia as well as in most other transition economies, are 
starting to look like banks elsewhere. They are by no means problem-free, but the chal-
lenges they need to tackle are similar to what banks in other emerging economies face. 
Given their growing role in economic development, surprisingly little is known about these 
banks' risk-taking behaviour.  
The development of the banking sector in transition economies, as well as the fi-
nancial sector in general, have been studied extensively. Barisitz (2008) and Bonin and 
Wachtel (2003) provide excellent recent overviews. Many studies focus on the effects of 
bank privatization on their performance in transition countries (see e.g. Bonin et al. 
(2005a) and (2005b)), but until recently risk-taking by banks in transition has been a large-
ly neglected area of research. Recent literature on the Russian banking sector has focused 
on bank supervision and the introduction of the deposit insurance system (Camara and  
Montes-Negret, 2006; Vernikov, 2007; Claeys and Schoors, 2007), market discipline and 
deposit interest rates (Karas, Pyle and Schoors, 2006; Peresetsky, Karminsky and Golovan, 
2007) and the efficiency of banks (Styrin, 2005; Karas, Schoors and Weill, 2008). 
A handful of recent papers provide cross-country evidence on bank risk-taking in 
emerging economies. Haselmann and Wachtel (2007) use several accounting measures of Zuzana Fungáčová and Laura Solanko  Risk-taking by Russian banks: 




bank risk to examine the risk-taking behaviour of banks in 20 transition countries including 
Russia. They analyse differences in risk measures by bank ownership, size and market 
share. Using survey data from the EBRD, they complement the analysis with various 
measures of institutional quality. The results suggest that there is no group of banks with 
excessive risk-taking and that an unsound institutional environment leads to higher capital 
holdings and less credit risk-taking by banks. Maechler et al. (2007) examine the effect of 
various types of financial risks on the bank stability in 18 Central and Eastern European 
economies. Their results indicate that foreign banks tend to have a higher risk profile than 
domestic ones but there is no significant difference between the risk profiles of larger and 
smaller banks. Furthermore, credit growth relates to greater bank stability and only the ac-
celeration of growth seems to add vulnerability.  
To the best of our knowledge, no study on bank risk-taking has focused solely on 
Russia or any other CIS country. However, with its 1100 banking institutions, Russia in 
particular provides an extremely rich test case for analysing risk-taking. Additionally, the 
large number of bank failures during the last decade highlights the fact that banking in 
Russia is still riskier than in most developed countries. Therefore examining the determi-
nants of risk-taking is crucial for understanding the prospects for future economic growth. 
Furthermore, if Russia is to become a global financial centre, a goal clearly stated by, e.g., 
President Medvedev in spring 2008, we need to know much more about the behaviour of 
Russian banking institutions.  
Currently the Russian banking sector is extremely fragmented, with a few large 
banks and a great number of very small ones. Especially in comparison with Central Euro-
pean transition economies, the state has retained a large share of control whereas the role 
of foreign banks has been minimal. These two structural features have often been men-
tioned as the main hindrances to further banking sector reform and growth. In this paper 
we discuss the extent to which the characteristic features of the sector determine the risk-
taking behaviour of Russian banks.  
We are able to use a large panel of practically all Russian commercial banks cov-
ering the post-1998-crisis period, from April 1999 to April 2007. The large, Moscow-based 
and state-controlled banks form the backbone of the Russian banking sector. In line with 
previous literature, we therefore focus on the effects of bank size and ownership structure 
on bank risk-taking. Furthermore, we control for the location of the banks to see if Mos-
cow-based banks, due to their better access to domestic and international interbank mar-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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kets, differ in their risk-taking habits. Additionally, we are able to examine the influence of 
what probably was the most important institutional change during the period, the introduc-
tion of a deposit insurance scheme, on the risk-taking of Russian banks.  
In measuring risk-taking, we use two approaches. First, we conduct a univariate 
analysis of traditional financial risk ratios based on accounting data. Second, we run a re-
gression analysis of bank insolvency risk measured by the z-score indicator. The two ap-
proaches produce similar results; large banks, regional banks and foreign-owned banks are 
found to be more risk-taking than other banks.  
The next section provides a brief overview of the Russian banking sector. Section 
three describes the data and provides group-wise comparisons of financial risk measures by 
size and ownership categories and by location, as well as by inclusion in the deposit insur-
ance scheme. Section four complements the previous results with a z-score analysis and 
section five concludes the analysis.  
 
 
2  On recent developments in the Russian banking sector  
 
After the crisis-ridden 1990's, especially the deep recession and financial collapse of 1998, 
the Russian economy has grown annually by more than six percent since 2000. The bank-
ing system has experienced rapid growth since 2001, when the sector recovered from the 
insolvencies and the complete lack of trust created by the 1998 turmoil. Bank credit to the 
private sector as a ratio to GDP has more than doubled since then. Total banking sector as-
sets accounted for more than 60% of GDP at the end of 2007, up from one third in 2000. 
This is very rapid growth even compared to the fast-growing emerging economies of Cen-
tral and Southeastern Europe. The resulting financial deepening has been supported by a 
stable macroeconomic environment, increasing incomes and institutional reforms.  
Continuous economic growth, rising real incomes, declining inflation and public 
sector surpluses have enabled fast increases in the private sector credit share. The majority 
of credits are financed by private sector deposits, which have increased by 10 per cent an-
nually during the last six years (CBR, 2007). Also net foreign borrowing has increased, 
even though the level of total foreign liabilities in Russian banks is still relatively modest 
at on average below 20% of total liabilities. Zuzana Fungáčová and Laura Solanko  Risk-taking by Russian banks: 




Table 1  Banking system assets, % of GDP 
   2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total  assets  42.1 41.7 44.8 51.9 61.0 
net foreign asset position  -1.4  -1.9  -2.7  -5.9  -9.0 
credit to the private sector  20.2 22.8 25.2 29.9 37.2 
o/w  enterprises  18.3 19.6 20.3 22.9 28.2 
o/w  households  1.9 3.2 4.9 7.0 9.0 
deposits  by  the  public  23.6 24.4 27.3 32.0 37.0 
o/w  households  11.5 11.6 12.8 14.2 15.6 
*beginning of period stocks 
Source: Central Bank of Russia  
 
Furthermore, a number of important institutional reforms have undoubtedly helped fuel 
banking sector growth. The most important one was the introduction of the deposit insur-
ance system (DIS). The federal law on compulsory deposit insurance was adopted in De-
cember 2003. The law made the formerly implicit guarantee of state-controlled banks ex-
plicit and outlined clear rules for banks entering the system. The Deposit Insurance Au-
thority began its operations in 2004, and by the end of March 2005 the first 824 banks were 
admitted into the system. Most of the rejected banks were small, as the banks already ad-
mitted accounted for 98 percent of household deposits. This did raise some concerns on the 
entry requirements not being interpreted rigorously enough (IMF, 2005).
  
By the end of September 2005, when the deadline for joining the system expired, 
927 banks out of the 1150 applicants were admitted (Camara & Montes-Negret, 2006)
1. 
During 2006-2007 Central Bank of Russia (CBR) gradually revoked the licenses to attract 
household deposits from banks not included in the system. Initially private deposits up to 
RUR 100,000 were covered in full. Later the coverage limit was raised to RUR 190,000 in 
August 2006 and to RUR 400,000 in March 2007. During 2003-2005 also several other 
important laws, e.g., clarifying the rules for mortgage lending and mortgage-backed securi-
ties, were enacted. The law from 2005 gave the framework for the operations of private 
credit bureaux. 
During the last few years Russian banks have intensively diversified into house-
hold lending, especially mortgages, as well as lending to SMEs. Credit maturities have also 
                                                 
1 In order to pacify depositors during the mini-banking crisis of summer 2004, the government enacted a law 
granting temporary deposit insurance to all banks. Therefore, irrespective of possible inclusion in the deposit BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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increased and maturities of over three years are not uncommon. The volumes of mortgage 
lending are, however, still tiny as less than 10% of homes in Russia are bought using a 
mortgage (Interfax, 2008). Another remarkable recent trend is the continuing de-
dollarization of banking assets and liabilities. Like many transition countries, Russia was 
heavily dollarised and immediately after the 1998 crisis the use of dollars was very wide-
spread. The share of foreign currency loans has now stabilised at below 25% of corporate 
loans. Corporate borrowers typically have a significant portion of their earnings in foreign 
currencies, so currency mismatches should not pose a systemic risk.  
In light of all these changes, the structure of the Russian banking sector has re-
mained surprisingly unchanged. The large, state-controlled banks still dominate the mar-
ket. Even though the number of banks has decreased from 2,084 at the end of 2000 to a 
mere 1,243 by the end of 2007, the great majority of the banks are still tiny and can hardly 
be called banks. At the end of 2007 some 900 banks had the right to attract household de-
posits and only 300 banks had a general banking licence. The foreign ownership share re-
mained fairly limited. There were 202 banks with a foreign ownership at the end of 2007, 
62 of them fully foreign-owned. 
 
 
3  Measuring risk – financial and regulation ratios 
 
3.1  Data 
 
Our dataset covers most of the banks operating in Russia over the period of April 1999 – 
April 2007. It consists of banks' quarterly balance sheets and profit and loss accounts. Reg-
ulatory ratios calculated by the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) are also partially included in 
our data and we use them in the analysis to support our main results. The data are provided 
by the financial information agency Interfax and originated in the Central Bank of Russia. 
For a more detailed description of the dataset used, see Karas and Schoors (2005). As the 
sample period starts in 1999, our results are not directly influenced by the financial crises 
of August 1998. The data constitutes an unbalanced panel, because there were banks enter-
ing and leaving the market due to mergers or failures. A brief overview of the main va-
riables based on summary statistics is provided in Table A.1 in the appendix. 
                                                                                                                                                    
insurance system, all Russian banks were guaranteed blanket deposit insurance for deposits up to RUR 
100,000 from July 2004 until the end of 2006 (IMF 2004).  Zuzana Fungáčová and Laura Solanko  Risk-taking by Russian banks: 




The banks are divided into different subgroups by size, ownership and location as 
well as inclusion in the deposit insurance system. We use the book value of total bank as-
sets as a measure of size
2. Bank size is especially important in Russia, where a handful of 
the largest banks account for most of the banking sector assets. At the end of 2006, large 
state-controlled banks accounted for about 40% of the sector assets (CBR, 2006). Taking 
into account the overly concentrated nature of the Russian banking sector, we also use a 
dummy variable for the three largest banks (Sberbank, VTB and Gazprombank). In gener-
al, due to more possibilities for diversification and better access to financial markets, large 
banks are supposed to be less risky. Nevertheless, as Demsetz and Strahan (1997) point 
out, large banks offset their potential benefits from diversification with lower capital ratios 
and more risky loan portfolios. Also empirical evidence on the relationship between size 
and risk has produced slightly mixed results (Iannotta et al. 2007, Haselmann and Wachtel 
2007).  
As for ownership, we distinguish among three ownership groups to determine ma-
jority ownership: state-controlled, foreign and domestic private banks. The foreign owner-
ship dummy variable is based on the CBR data on 100% foreign-owned banks published 
quarterly. State-controlled banks are defined using the list provided in Vernikov (2007)
3.  
Ownership may be important for risk-taking behaviour for various reasons. State-
owned banks are often assumed to take higher risks than the private ones. The underlying 
reasons differ according to one's view on the character of state-owned banks. Sapienza 
(2004) distinguishes three alternative views. The social view suggests that state banks in-
tervene to correct for the market failure caused by private banks, which "cherry-pick" the 
best customers and would leave the not very profitable ones without financial services. 
This view implies that state banks are engaged in more risky and less profitable operations 
but possibly enjoy soft budget constraints. The political view sees state banks as well as 
state enterprises more as a mechanism for pursuing politicians' private interests, such as 
maximising employment or delivering favours for political protégées. This view implies 
that state banks may be forced to lend on a non-commercial basis i.e. due to political or 
other reasons. The agency view sees state banks as basically benevolent maximizers of so-
                                                 
2 Alternative measures of size based on the market share of the aggregate domestic credit as well as participa-
tion in the interbank market provide us with a very similar distribution of banks into subgroups and therefore 
we only use total assets as a proxy for bank size. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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cial welfare but plagued by corruption and misallocation. Recent evidence from industria-
lised countries (DeNicolo 2001, Iannotta et al. 2007) suggests that state-owned banks typi-
cally exhibit higher risk than other types of banks.  
Studies on transition economies have, however, produced mixed results (DeNico-
lo and Loukoianova 2007, Maechler et al. 2007). In transition economies state-owned 
banks may be less efficient and more risk-prone due to Soviet legacies, unrestructured 
management or soft budget constraints. These findings, usually based on Central European 
countries
4, are challenged by Karas et al. (2008), who show that in Russia state-owned 
banks are not less efficient than domestic private banks.  
Foreign-owned banks may have a different risk profile due to less local expertise 
and fewer local connections compared to the domestically owned banks. Their operations 
may also be less risky since they might often be able to cherry pick the most creditworthy 
borrowers in an emerging market (Bhaumik and Piesse, 2007). Additionally, these banks 
can often rely on strong parent companies to provide them with access to better risk man-
agement techniques and possible diversification of country risk. On the other hand, foreign 
ownership may aggravate risks if parent banks tend to stress rapid credit growth in order to 
relieve tightening interest margins at home. Moreover, integration into the global financial 
system has also highlighted new issues related to risk management and financial vulnera-
bility (BIS, 2005).  
Foreign bank entry has been one of the decisive factors shaping banking sector 
development in Central and Eastern European transition countries. The available empirical 
evidence supports the common view that foreign-owned banks are more efficient than oth-
er types of banks in these countries (Bonin et al. 2005, Barisitz 2008 and references there-
in). Furthermore, there is a growing literature exploring the effects of the presence of for-
eign-owned banks on domestic credit markets in emerging economies.
5 The role of for-
eign-owned banks in Russia has been dramatically different from those in the Central Eu-
ropean banking sector. The share of foreign capital in the Russian banking sector was tiny 
                                                                                                                                                    
3 This list largely overlaps with the other lists of state-controlled banks used by Karas et al. (2008). More-
over, our number also corresponds to the number of government-controlled banks in the Bank Supervision 
Report (2006). 
4 See e.g. Bonin et al. (2005a). 
5 Mostly the results on the benefits of the foreign bank presence are mixed. Detragiache et al. (2008) show 
that banks give fewer loans after being acquired by a foreign investor. Clarke et al. (2005) find that foreign 
banks make more loans to SMEs than domestic ones. Foreign banks may be reluctant to lend to opaque bor-
rowers, but induce domestic banks to lend to them (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2004). Giannetti and Ongena (2008) 
suggest that foreign banks enhance access to credit, especially where financial development is low. Zuzana Fungáčová and Laura Solanko  Risk-taking by Russian banks: 




up until spring 2007 as no major privatizations had taken place. The Russian banking sec-
tor is clearly more distant (both geographically and culturally) and therefore less attractive 
than the new and prospective EU member countries. Moreover, acquiring a large market 
share is not as easy as it was in Central Europe. Nevertheless, the foreign-owned banks op-
erating in Russia may be extremely important as a benchmark for domestic ones and it is 
therefore most interesting to examine if they differ in their risk-taking. 
The division by ownership and size is rather standard. A bank's location within a 
single country and its inclusion in the deposit insurance scheme are more specific to Rus-
sia. Economic developments in different parts of Russia vary a lot. About half of the Rus-
sian banks are located in Moscow. The other half, located in the other regions of the Rus-
sian Federation, are mainly small banks constituting only 15% of the total banking sector 
assets. It has been occasionally argued that regional banks are more inclined to lend to lo-
cal enterprises and to small and medium-sized businesses, thereby promoting growth more 
than Moscow-based banks. Moscow-based banks, on the other hand, are more active in 
interbank money markets. If true, this should also be reflected in differences in risk meas-
ures. Therefore we split the sample into two depending on the location of the bank's head-
quarters in Moscow or elsewhere in the Russian Federation.  
Russia adopted a deposit insurance system in 2004 with the majority of banks 
screened and admitted into the system by end-March 2005. The deposit insurance system 
was expected to increase the confidence in and stability of the banking sector, as well as to 
level the playing field between large and small banks. The academic literature on deposit 
insurance increasingly emphasizes that explicit deposit insurance has the potential to affect 
bank risk-taking. Since it reduces depositors' incentives to monitor banks, it may encourage 
risk-taking and imprudent banking practices (Kane-Dumirguc, 2001). The Russian data 
offers us a unique opportunity to test whether the introduction of a deposit insurance sys-
tem affects bank risk-taking in the short run. We consider two groups of banks based on 
the point at which they entered the system. We create a dummy variable indicating if the 
bank was included into the system in the "first wave", by end-March 2005. Inclusion of the 
banks in the deposit insurance system is defined using the information from the Russian 
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3.2  Risks faced by banks and corresponding financial ratios 
 
Banking is by nature a business of balancing risks. There is, however, no single, universal 
measure that could be used to assess risk-taking behaviour by banks. Thus, we rely on two 
different approaches. The first one is based on a univariate analysis of financial risk ratios, 
which are either calculated using the accounting data or belong to the regulatory ratios 
used by the central bank. We analyse different categories of financial risk separately by 
employing the relevant financial ratios as well as regulation ratios used by the CBR (for 
definitions, see Table A.8 with a description of variables in the appendix). Furthermore, we 
also test the significance of the differences in financial risk ratios among different sub-
groups of banks
6. The second approach, discussed in section four, relies on the regression 





Capitalization is calculated as a ratio of equity to total assets and it serves to measure leve-
rage risk. Due to rapid asset growth, the level of capitalization declines during the period 
analysed (see Table A.2 in the appendix). Capitalization is, however, still higher than in 
most other transition countries as reported in Haselmann and Wachtel (2007). On average, 
capitalization decreases with size and thus small banks tend to have higher capital ratios 
than larger banks. This is in line with the "too big to fail" hypothesis as well as with the 
perceived difficulties smaller banks face in accessing interbank markets in Russia. Larger 
banks in general have better opportunities for risk diversification and thus also benefit 
from lower costs of funding (McAllister and McManus, 1993).   
The capitalization of private banks is significantly higher than that of state and 
foreign banks during the whole period under review. These banks, unlike state-controlled 
or foreign banks, usually do not have a kind of "backup" in the form of the state or a strong 
parent company abroad. That is most probably the reason why they hold a higher propor-
tion of equity capital. Foreign banks are slightly better capitalized than state banks, which 
is consistent with the results for the CIS in De Nicolo and Loukoianova (2007). Banks lo-
cated outside Moscow tend to maintain lower equity, but the gap between regional and 
Moscow banks has decreased since 2006 and thus the difference between these two groups 
                                                 
6 We use a nonparametric K-sample test on the equality of medians. Zuzana Fungáčová and Laura Solanko  Risk-taking by Russian banks: 




of banks is no longer significant. Banks included in the DIS maintain a significantly lower 
equity than the other banks. There are two possible explanations for this. The first one con-
cerns moral hazard issues connected with the participation in the deposit insurance scheme. 
The other is selection bias. It indicates that the banks entering the system were the better 
ones, which, based on their results, were obvious candidates for inclusion immediately 
when the system was introduced.  
The CBR regulation ratio N1 used to assess capital adequacy7 confirms these 
trends as well. Even though the capital adequacy ratio has declined in recent years, its av-
erage value of 14.5% for November 2006 (CBR, 2006) still clearly exceeds the minimal 
requirements set by the central bank8. This indicates that Russian banks on average tend to 
keep slightly higher capital buffers than banks in the EU-25 countries as Jokipii and Milne 
(2008) report. It is, however, clear that relatively large capital buffers at the beginning of 
our sample period are a natural reaction to the uncertainty following the crisis of 1998. The 
gradual decrease of capital buffers is then to a certain extent the result of the improvements 
in the macroeconomic environment. The most recent development provides additional evi-
dence for this claim. While at the end of 2004, banks that constituted about 43% of the 
banking sector assets had a capital adequacy ratio of 14% or higher, at the end of 2006 this 
ratio was between 10–12% for banks with 45% of the banking assets (CBR, 2007). The 
unfavourable global development resulting from the sub-prime crisis and liquidity prob-
lems in the second half of 2007 made banks more cautious again and the majority of banks 
(holding 60% of banking assets) increased their capital adequacy ratio to 14% or more at 
the end of 2007 (CBR, 2007). Nevertheless, the general trend of a decreasing capital ade-
quacy ratio, which still prevails, may also indicate that the operations of Russian banks are 
becoming more efficient or that the institutional environment is improving (Bonin et al., 






                                                 
7 Unlike the indicator of capitalization, the N1 ratio is for most of the banks available only until 2005. 
8 The Financial Stability Report 2006 issued by the central bank reports that according to Bank of Russia 
Instruction No. 110_I, dated January 16, 2004, the minimum capital adequacy ratio for a bank (N1) is 10% if 
the bank has a capital of at least 5 million euros and 11% if the bank has a capital of less than 5 million euros. 
Only 11 credit institutions violated the capital adequacy ratio in 2006 and 19 in 2005 (Bank of Russia Finan-
cial Stability Report, 2006).  
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Credit risk  
 
Analysing credit risks is becoming increasingly important in Russia due to its rapid credit 
growth. The increase in the loans to total assets ratio (see Table A.3 in the appendix) sug-
gests that the growth of lending has been higher than the growth in total assets, implying a 
gradual shift towards riskier operations of banks. Domestic banks have significantly higher 
lending ratios than foreign banks, whereas regional banks tend to lend more than Moscow-
based ones. On average, however, the  total loans to total assets ratio in our sample is com-
parable with the sample of transition economies as reported in Haselmann and Wachtel 
(2007). Similar to our expectations, banks that belong to the deposit insurance system lend 
more. There are again two possible explanations for this. The first one suggests that banks 
in the DIS may take more risks as they are backed up by the system. The latter indicates 
that insured banks are on average better and more efficient and therefore they are able to 
bear higher risks.  
One of the most commonly used indicators of credit risk is the ratio of nonper-
forming loans (NPL) to total loans. The share of NPLs in Russia has indeed increased dur-
ing the last years, but the levels are not yet anywhere close to becoming alarming. The me-
dian levels based on our calculations (see Table A.4 in the appendix) are still below the 
quality level of 1.5 per cent recommended by Grier (2001). It is, however, necessary to 
bear in mind that this is an ex post measure of the risks assumed by banks. When consider-
ing banks by ownership, state-controlled banks exhibit a significantly higher ratio of non-
performing loans than others. One might take this as indirect evidence of state-controlled 
banks' lending, willingly or unwillingly, to any customer, also to the uncreditworthy one. It 
is, however, interesting to note that the share of NPLs among the state-controlled banks has 
stayed basically unchanged in recent years. The recent increase in the NPL share has been 
caused mainly by private domestic banks. On the other hand, foreign banks have the lowest 
level of NPLs, which may reflect their relatively short period of operation on the Russian 
market, better credit risk management, or both.  
The ratio of NPLs is increasing with the bank's size, which suggests that larger 
banks are able to sustain a larger proportion of NPLs. The difference between small and 
large banks is, however, gradually decreasing. The shrinking of this gap is the result of 
both an increase in the NPL ratio of small banks and a decrease among the large ones. De-
spite this development, the variation between banks of different sizes still remains signifi-Zuzana Fungáčová and Laura Solanko  Risk-taking by Russian banks: 




cant. There are significant differences in the proportion of NPLs by location as well. Even 
though regional banks still tend to have a larger ratio of NPLs, similar to when we account 
for size, the gap between Moscow and regional banks has decreased recently. There are 
also differences between banks that are part of the deposit insurance system and the ones 
that are not. The ones included in the scheme have in general higher nonperforming loan 
ratios, which can be a natural consequence of higher lending by these banks.   
Since banks with nonperforming loans are obliged to make loan loss provisions, a 
comparable measure of credit risk is the ratio of loan loss reserves to total loans. Its devel-
opment basically corresponds to changes in the proportion of nonperforming loans (see 
Table A.4 in the appendix). The proportion of loan loss reserves in total loans is the lowest 
for the foreign-owned banks. Even though the proportion of loan loss reserves was the 
highest for the three largest banks in 1999, nowadays this ratio is basically the same for 
banks of all sizes. This seems to serve as evidence for the special position of these state-
controlled banks. The loan loss indicator further suggests that the deposit insurance scheme 
implementation contributed to changes in loan loss reserves. Before the deposit insurance 
scheme was implemented, loan loss reserves were significantly higher for the banks that 
later entered the scheme. However, with the implementation of the scheme, reserves in the 
banks not included in the system increased and they are higher compared to the banks that 
are part of the DIS. 
Maximum large credit risk is a regulation ratio that measures the proportion of the 
total amount of large credit risks
9 in a bank's equity capital. It increases over time and 
tends to be higher for the state-controlled banks and for the regional banks. This could in-
dicate that these banks have close connections with large state-controlled or regional com-
panies. The maximum large credit risk ratio is also higher for larger banks with the excep-
tion of the three largest ones. Moreover, it is significantly lower for the banks outside the 
deposit insurance system, which once again indicates that banks that are part of the system 
are able to engage in relatively more risky activities. 
Even though our analysis of credit risk measures suggests that the operations of 
state-controlled banks tend to be relatively riskier than the others, the comparison of the 
credit risk indicators to the corresponding figures in other countries as well as to the criti-
cal values indicated in the literature suggest no excessive risk-taking. Our results are thus 
                                                 
9 Large credit is the total sum of the bank's risk-weighted claims to one borrower (or a group of related bor-
rowers) on credits. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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in line with the CBR (Financial Stability Report 2006) in that, on average, the credit risk of 





The Russian banking sector's liquidity as measured by the ratio of liquid to total assets has 
decreased slightly in recent years, but its level, reported in Table A.6 in the appendix, is 
still comparable to the other transition countries as well as to the quality level recommend-
ed by Grier (2001). An analysis of the regulatory ratios of quick and current liquidity (see 
Table A.8 in the appendix for detailed definitions) confirms that they have remained basi-
cally unchanged. Foreign banks and Moscow-based banks exhibit the highest level of li-
quidity during the whole period under review. One possible explanation for this phenome-
non is that Moscow-based banks are on average less engaged in traditional banking opera-
tions (collecting retail deposits and channelling them into corporate loans) than regional 
banks. Furthermore, Moscow-based banks tend to be more active in interbank money mar-
kets and therefore have a larger proportion of their assets in a highly liquid form. This dif-
ference in bank operations is reflected in the increasing gap in the liquidity indicator be-
tween Moscow and regional banks. From the point of view of foreign banks, their opera-
tions on the emerging market may be considered more risky and this could lead them to the 
decision to hold more liquid assets. It is, however, important to note that the difference in 
liquidity between foreign banks on the one hand and state-controlled and private banks on 
the other has decreased recently. Unlike the divisions by region and ownership, the distri-
bution of banks by size does not indicate any significant differences in liquidity for banks 
of various sizes. Moreover, in line with the other credit risk indicators, the banks included 
in the deposit insurance scheme hold lower levels of liquidity and the gap between them 
and the other Russian banks has been increasing since 2005. 
In general, high liquidity ratios can be interpreted as having a positive influence 
on stability at certain levels of liquidity. In the case of emerging economies, liquidity ratios 
may also be higher if the government does not actively intervene to meet funding gaps, fi-
nancial institutions are risk-averse or if there are not enough opportunities for hedging 
(Moreno, 2006). In that case excessive liquidity could indicate structural problems. A bank 
may be highly liquid simply because: i) it cannot rely on well-functioning interbank mar-
kets or other secondary markets such as those for securities; ii) it prefers to distance itself Zuzana Fungáčová and Laura Solanko  Risk-taking by Russian banks: 




from "traditional" banking operations such as lending in favour of trading in, e.g., govern-
ment securities; or iii) both.  
Despite sufficient liquidity in general, there has been a lack of efficient mechan-
isms for interbank intermediation of liquidity. The Russian interbank market is relatively 
small even in comparison to other emerging markets (Moreno, 2006). This is especially the 
result of high segmentation and low trust on the interbank market (Barisitz, 2008), even 
among the big state-controlled banks. Russian banks are highly liquid but the banking sys-
tem as a whole is not. Due to the lack of trust, the banking system is vulnerable to occa-
sional liquidity shocks as experienced in summer 2004 and autumn 2007. This clearly 






The net interest margin
10 as a percentage of loans is often used as a proxy for the efficiency 
of financial intermediation, thus uncovering the health of the banking sector. Higher mar-
gins indicate lower efficiency and lower competition within the sector and thereby possibly 
also higher risk. Our analysis indicates that foreign banks have significantly lower net in-
terest margins than private banks, even though recent developments suggest that the net 
interest margins of foreign banks have increased to the level of state-controlled ones (see 
Table A.7 in the appendix). In this respect, lower margins most probably reflect the greater 
efficiency of foreign banks which is connected to the support and know-how from their 
parent companies. Our indicators are thus in line with Karas et al. (2008), who find that 
Russian state banks are more efficient than domestic private banks. The net interest margin 
decreases with the bank's size and therefore it is the lowest for the group of the three larg-
est banks. Regional banks used to have significantly higher net interest margins. However, 
the situation has changed recently and consequently Moscow-based banks have slightly 
higher margins, which may suggest increasing efficiency and/or competition. After the im-
plementation of the DIS, the net interest margins of the banks included in it decreased and 
became significantly lower than the margins of the other banks. This development may in-
                                                 
10 The net interest margin is calculated as the difference between the interest income from loans to customers 
and the interest expense paid on customer deposits. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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dicate a positive impact of the DIS introduction on the banking sector's competition and 
efficiency; however, more investigation is necessary to confirm this result. 
To sum up, the analysis of ratios measuring financial risk confirms significant dif-
ferences among groups of Russian banks by size, location, ownership and participation in 
the DIS. Nevertheless, it is only based on the comparisons of unconditional medians. The 




4  Measuring risk - bank insolvency risk (z-score) 
 
In addition to the four classes of bank risk ratios, we use a measure for insolvency risk de-
veloped by Boyd and Graham (1988)
 11 that has been increasingly used in the banking lite-
rature. Different modifications of z-scores have been applied in the empirical cross-country 
(De Nicolo, 2001; Boyd et al., 2006; De Nicolo and Loukoianova, 2007; Maechler et al., 
2007; Iannotta et al., 2007) as well as single-country studies (Konishi and Yasuda, 2004; 
Lin et al., 2005). 
 
The insolvency risk measure ("z-score" hereafter) is a statistic indicating the prob-
ability of bankruptcy (bank failure). The z-score for each bank i at quarter j is calculated 
as: 
 
Zij = (ROAit + EQTAit) / σ(ROA)it  (1) 
 
where ROAit and σ(ROA)it are sample estimates of the four quarters moving average and 
the four quarters standard deviation of bank i's returns on assets at quarters t to t-3 and 
EQTAit is the four quarters moving average of the equity capital to assets ratio. A bank's 
return on assets is calculated as its one-quarter profit before taxes on the quarter's average 
total assets. A bank's equity to assets ratio is calculated as the equity capital on total assets 
at the end of a given quarter. As we used the four quarters (backward-looking) moving av-
erages in constructing our insolvency measure as well as explanatory variables, the time 
span of our analysis effectively covers the years 2000-2006. 
Statistically speaking, the z-score represents the number of standard deviations re-
turns would have to fall in order to deplete a bank's equity, under the assumption of nor-Zuzana Fungáčová and Laura Solanko  Risk-taking by Russian banks: 




mality of the bank's returns. Boyd et al. (2006), however, argue that "it (the z-score) does 
not require that profits be normally distributed to be a valid probability measure; indeed, 
all it requires is the existence of the first four moments of the return distribution". A higher 
z-score corresponds to a greater distance to equity depletion and therefore to lower risk and 
higher bank stability. 
The z-score measure inherently depends on the assumption that the ROA, relying 
on profit and loss data, gives a useful approximation of a bank's financial health. Since our 
data is based on Russian accounting system standards, which stress formal reporting rather 
than economic meaning, it may be questioned whether our data fulfils that requirement 
(Barisitz, 2008). Nevertheless, as we only compare Russian banks with each other, possible 
flaws in the accounting standards should not be over-emphasized. Moreover, we use the z-
score indicator to uncover statistically significant conditional correlations, not causality.  
 
 
4.1  Methodology 
 
Our focus is on the effects of a bank's size, ownership, location and inclusion in the deposit 
insurance scheme on its insolvency risk (z-score). The bank's size is measured by a conti-
nuous variable (logarithm of total assets) whereas ownership, location and inclusion in the 
deposit insurance scheme are proxied by using corresponding dummy variables. The 
dummy variable for inclusion in the deposit insurance scheme is fully time-invariant whe-
reas the dummy variables for ownership and location exhibit very little if any within varia-
tion. Therefore a standard fixed-effects model is likely to lead to inefficient estimates with 
very large standard errors.
12  
We remedy the problem by applying the fixed effects vector decomposition 
(FEVD) approach by Plümper and Tröger (2007). The approach suggests estimating the 
model in three steps. First, our dependent variable is regressed only on the cross-section 
fixed effect and the time-varying factors. Second, the estimated fixed effect (unit effect) is 
decomposed into the part explained by the time-invariant variables and the unexplainable 
part (error term). Finally, the model including the unexplained part of the fixed effect is re-
estimated by pooled OLS. By design, the remaining error term is no longer correlated with 
                                                                                                                                                    
11 This measure originated as a predictor of corporate bankruptcy (Altman, 1968). 
12 For recent discussions on fixed-effect models with time invariant variables, see, e.g., Beck (2007) and Wil-
son and Butler (2007). For a classic textbook approach using Hausman-Taylor procedures, see Wooldridge 
(2002), 235-238. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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time-invariant variables. Plümper and Tröger (2007) show that FEVD estimates are supe-
rior (in root mean squared errors) to the traditional fixed effects estimation. In running the 
FEVD estimations, we use STATA's FEVD module. 
 
We estimate the following model: 
 
(2) ce DepInsuran Region Owner
seas IA GDP BankSpec Size ln(z)
it i i i
t it t it it i it
ε β β β
β β β β β α
+ + + +
+ + + + + =
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•  z is the z-score for bank i at time t calculated as indicated in the equation (1) 
•  size stands for the logarithm of total assets of bank i at time t 
•  bankSpec is a set of bank i's specific ratios at time t including liquidity, credit growth 
  and the share of loans to individuals in  total loans  
•  GDP corresponds to growth rate of GDP in the previous quarter 
•  IA is a set of interaction dummy variables between a bank's size and bank-specific  
 factors 
•  owner is a set of dummy variables distinguishing among foreign, state-controlled and 
 private  banks 
•  region is a dummy variable indicating Moscow headquarters of bank i at time t 
•  seas stands for seasonal (i.e. quarterly) dummy variables 
•  depInsurance is a dummy variable indicating inclusion in the first wave of the deposit 
 insurance  system 
 
All the variables used in the regressions are four-quarter moving averages. Z-score and to-
tal asset variables are in natural logarithms. Bank-specific factors include credit growth, 
the liquidity ratio and the share of loans to individuals in total loans. Macroeconomic va-
riables are proxied by GDP growth. A bank's size, ownership, location and inclusion in the 
first wave of the deposit insurance system are defined as in the analysis of bank risk ratios 
in the previous section. To remove potential outliers, 0.5% of both tails of each variable in 
every quarter was removed. Table A.8 in the appendix gives details of the variables used in 
the regressions. 
A priori, the sign of the coefficient on a bank's size is indeterminate because large 
banks may be either stabilizing or risky for the banking system, as our previous analysis of 
risk ratios suggests.  
Bank-specific risks are captured by the measures of credit risk and liquidity risk. 
Credit risk is proxied by bank-by-bank credit growth as well as the ratio of loans to indi-Zuzana Fungáčová and Laura Solanko  Risk-taking by Russian banks: 




viduals to total loans. Liquidity risk is controlled for by introducing the liquidity ratio (liq-
uid assets / total assets) to the model. A priori we do not have an expectation of the sign for 
these variables. 
Finally, we control for GDP growth as macroeconomic developments may influ-
ence the stability of the banking sector. Due to the structure of its exports, Russia is in par-
ticular vulnerable to fluctuations in the price of oil. Oil price and GDP are highly and posi-
tively correlated in Russia (Rautava, 2004). Moreover, due to less than perfect sterilization 
by the Russian Central Bank, higher export prices tend to increase liquidity in the Russian 
money market. Better liquidity in the interbank money market may induce banks to hold 




4.2  Estimation results 
 
In order to analyse the relationship between a bank's size, ownership and location and the 
risk measured by the z-score, we estimate the model of equation (2) employing the fixed 
effects vector decomposition described above. The main results are shown in Table 2 be-
low.  
Several interesting findings emerge. First, the results consistently indicate that 
larger banks have significantly lower z-scores and thus higher insolvency risk. Second, 
somewhat unexpectedly, foreign-owned banks consistently bear higher insolvency risk 
than domestic private banks. This result is fully in line with some earlier studies on emerg-
ing economies using z-scores as the risk measure (Maechler et al., 2007). The result natu-
rally reflects the limitations of the risk measure used, as it partly originates from the lower 
capitalization ratios of the foreign banks. Furthermore, it is necessary to bear in mind that 
due to data limitations, our foreign ownership dummy variable only accounts for banks that 
are fully foreign-owned. The overall effect of state ownership on a bank's insolvency risk 
is positive, i.e. state-controlled banks tend to be more stable. To investigate this result more 
closely, we add the interaction term of size and state control to our model. This interaction 
is positive and highly significant. At the same time, the estimated coefficient for the state-
controlled dummy variable becomes negative. This indicates that only large state-
                                                 
13 We have also examined the influence of oil price growth in our model. The results are quantitatively the 
same as for GDP and thus we only report the model with a more standard GDP growth variable included.  
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controlled banks are driving our results and they are more stable than other state-controlled 
banks. 
Third, the Moscow-based banks are always more stable than the regional banks. 
And further, similar to our expectations, banks that became part of the deposit insurance 
system in the first wave are more stable. Economic development as measured by GDP 
growth does not have a significant influence on risk.  
Finally, we conclude that the bank-specific characteristics do have a significant 
role in explaining insolvency risk. In line with earlier literature (e.g. Maechler et al., 2007), 
we find that higher liquidity implies higher insolvency risk. We include an interaction vari-
able of bank size and liquidity, which confirms that large liquid banks are more stable. The 
growth of a bank's loan stock is used to control for the credit risk. In line with Maechler et 
al. (2007), its impact is positive in our estimations and this indicates higher stability. This 
result holds true for Moscow-based banks, while for regional banks the estimated coeffi-
cient is negative. We also control for the interaction of bank size and credit growth to see if 
credit growth affects small banks differently. We find that large banks with high credit 
growth are in fact more stable than the rest of the sector. 
 
Table 2  Estimation results 
  
Estimated coefficient 
Size (total assets)  -0.155  *** 
Loans to households (prop. of loans)  -0.254  *** 
Liquidity (liquid to total assets)  -0.808  *** 
Credit growth  0.008  * 
GDP growth  -0.101    
OWNERSHIP, LOCATION AND DEPOSIT INSURANCE 
  
  
Deposit insurance  0.042  *** 
Foreign bank  -0.723  *** 
State-controlled bank  -0.819  *** 
Moscow-based bank  0.388  *** 
INTERACTIONS       
Size and liquidity  0.060  *** 
Size and credit growth  0.004  *** 
Size and state-controlled  0.111  *** 
Number of observations  27 149 
R
2   0.419 
Note:  The table contains results for the FEVD regression. We report estimated coefficients as well as their 
significance ( ***significant at 1%,** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%).  Seasonal dummy va-
riables and a constant term are included but not reported. 
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We test the robustness of our empirical results using several techniques. 
•  First, the results are robust to the exclusion of the three largest state-controlled banks 
  (Sberbank, Gazprombank, VTB) from the sample.  
•  We split the sample into Moscow-based and regional banks. The FEVD regression 
  model is run for the two subgroups separately. Except for the significance of credit 
  growth, other results for both subgroups are in line with the results of the main model 
  reported above. Nevertheless, the model seems to fit a little bit better the Moscow-based 
  banks, which account for about 85% of the banking sector assets. 
•  Finally, the results for the subsample of the 300 largest banks also correspond to our 
  main results reported in Table 2. They only differ in the sign of the deposit insurance 
  scheme dummy variable. In this case it is negative, which means that the banks that  
  entered the system in the first wave are more risky. This is in line with the results of  
  univariate analysis of financial ratios performed in the first part of the paper. 
 
 
4.3  Z-score components 
 
The z-score measure consists of three main components: the return on assets, capitalization 
and the volatility of the ROA. In order to investigate the contribution of each of them to 
explaining differences in the banks' stability, we run our basic model using all of these 
components as a dependent variable. This approach is in line with previous literature (De 
Nicolo and Loukoianova, 2007; Maechler et al. 2007). We report the results of the z-score 
component regressions in the following, Table 3.                                                                        
The first component of the z-score measure is capitalization
14. In this case, the fit 
measured by R
2 is the highest of all the z-score components. The estimated coefficients are 
larger than for the other z-score components and almost all of them are significant. The 
estimated coefficients are mostly in line with the results of the main model, which indi-
cates that the majority of the main results are driven by the contribution of the capitaliza-
tion ratio. Larger banks have lower capitalization and this result undoubtedly drives our 
final result that banks with a higher amount of total assets are in general less stable. More 
liquid banks have lower capitalization, which indicates that banks substitute between li-
quidity and solvency risk. Nevertheless, liquid large banks tend to have higher capitaliza-
tion. Both state-controlled and foreign ones are in general better capitalized than private 
ones. The effect of deposit insurance participation on capitalization is significantly nega-
                                                 
14 Capitalization is, similar to the calculation of the z-score, calculated as the four-quarter moving average. 
The other z-score components, the ROA and volatility of the ROA, are calculated in the same way. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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tive. Banks in the deposit insurance system do seem to substitute deposit insurance for cap-
ital, or put in other words, take more risks for the same level of capital. This result is in line 
with earlier literature (Demurgic-Kunt and Kane, 2001).   
 
Table 3  Z-score component regressions 
  
CAPITALIZATION ROA  VOLATILITY  
OF ROA 
Estimated coefficient  Estimated coefficient  Estimated coefficient 
Size (total assets)  -0.058  ***  -0.001  ***  -0.001  *** 
Loans to households  -0.075  ***  0.005  ***  0.001 
Liquidity (liquid to total assets)  -0.213  ***  0.004  ***  -0.001 
Credit growth  0.001  ***  0.0002  ***  -0.0004  *** 
GDP growth  0.156  ***  -0.023  ***  0.003 
OWNERSHIP, LOCATION 
AND DEPOSIT INSURANCE                
Deposit insurance  -0.027  ***  0.002  ***  -0.002  *** 
Foreign bank  0.044  ***  0.003  ***  0.009  *** 
State-controlled bank  0.036  ***  0.005  ***  0.006  *** 
Moscow-based bank  0.107  ***  -0.002  ***  0.001  *** 
INTERACTIONS          
Size and liquidity  0.002  ***  -4.3E-05  -0.001  *** 
Size and credit growth  -2.7E-04  ***  -2.4E-05  ***  -6.5E-06 
Size and state-controlled  0.001  -0.001  ***  -0.001  *** 
Number of observations  27149  27149  27149 
R
2    0.778 0.352 0.357 
Note: The table contains estimation results of the model described above for different z-score components. 
We report the estimated coefficients as well as their significance (* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% 
and *** significant at 1%). 
 
The second column contains results for the regression with the ROA as the dependent vari-
able. Similar to the capitalization component of the z-score, almost all the estimated coef-
ficients are significant for the ROA. However, the majority of their signs differ from the 
results in the main z-score regression. Higher credit growth as well as a higher share of 
loans to individuals in the bank portfolio are positively related to profitability. Higher li-
quidity positively influences profitability as measured by the ROA. This might be the con-
sequence of the different nature of operations banks are involved in. Banks performing 
other than standard banking services need to keep more liquid assets but these operations 
also seem to be more profitable. When accounting for a bank’s ownership, foreign banks Zuzana Fungáčová and Laura Solanko  Risk-taking by Russian banks: 




and state-controlled banks have a significantly higher ROA than domestic private ones. 
Large state-controlled banks are, however, less profitable. Banks included in the DIS in the 
"first wave" have significantly higher profitability than the others, which is in line with our 
previous result indicating that better banks entered the system first. Moscow-based banks 
are in general less profitable.  
The last component of our risk measure is the volatility of the ROA as measured 
by the standard deviation. Most of the estimated coefficients in this regression are signifi-
cant but have a different sign than the results presented in our main model. They are also 
lower in absolute values and therefore, unlike the measure of capitalization, they contribute 
less to the main results. Thus, the analysis of the z-score components indicates that the dif-
ferences in the risk profiles of banks are mostly driven by the differences in capitalization. 
 
 
5  Conclusion 
 
Favourable macroeconomic conditions and important regulatory reforms have backed the 
rapid growth of Russia's banking sector during this decade. As the economy is increasingly 
monetized, the role of banks and other financial intermediaries in supporting the conti-
nuous growth of investments and private consumption is gaining more importance. There-
fore the stability of the banking sector is even more crucial. The Russian banking sector is 
still rightfully characterized as small, regionally fragmented and dominated by a few large 
state-controlled entities.  
On average, the Russian banking sector is believed to be in good financial shape 
as evidenced also by the Banking Supervision Reports of the CBR. For this paper we use a 
bank-level dataset on all Russian banks to examine how various measures of risk vary with 
a bank's size, ownership, location and inclusion in the deposit insurance system. The main 
objective is the detailed examination of how these various groups of banks differ in their 
attitudes to risk. We employ two approaches; group-wise comparisons of financial ratios 
and regression analysis using a z-score measure of bank insolvency risk. The analysis of 
financial ratios reveals that even though the ratios point to increasing risk over time, they 
are still on average well on the safe side within all groups of banks. The average levels are 
all above the regulatory minima set by the Russian Central Bank. Moreover, they are com-
parable to other transition economies. The rapid growth of the banking sector has not led to 
excessive risk-taking on average.  BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




The regression analysis of the bank insolvency measure (z-score) proved to be a 
useful means of deepening the results of group-wise comparisons. Controlling for bank 
characteristics, large banks in Russia have higher insolvency risk than small ones. Second, 
in line with the previous literature on emerging economies, foreign-owned banks exhibit 
higher insolvency risk than domestic banks. Even though the foreign bank presence may in 
general greatly increase banking sector efficiency and widen the range of banking services 
available, foreign-owned banks in Russia seem to bear higher risks. The same holds true 
for the state-controlled banks; however, the large state-controlled banks are more stable 
than the others. Third, we find that the regional banks are significantly more prone to risk-
taking than their counterparts in Moscow. Regional banks only account for a small fraction 
of the total banking sector assets, thus this finding should not be alarming for the banking 
sector as a whole. 
All in all, we find that risk-taking by Russian banks is approaching levels compa-
rable to other emerging economies. Further, factors similar to those in emerging European 
economies seem to explain levels of insolvency risk in Russia. We also briefly examined if 
inclusion in the Russian deposit insurance scheme has influenced a bank’s insolvency risk. 
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Table A.1  Summary statistics of the main variables 
Variable   Obs  Mean  Median  Std.dev. 
Z-score (ln)  34700  4.25  4.20  1.24 
Total assets  41382  4105  307  52706 
Liquidity ratio  41380  0.33  0.28  0.22 
Loan loss provisions  40130  0.07  0.03  0.12 
Credit growth  33969  4.64  0.39  209.05 
GDP growth  40971  0.02  0.06  0.10 
Note: Summary statistics for the observations that are actually used  in the z-score regression are not   
significantly different from these figures. 
 
Table A.2  Capitalization ratio of banks by ownership, region, size and inclusion in DIS 
CAPITALIZATION  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
TOTAL SAMPLE  obs.  1469 1322 1312 1237 1327 1323 1238  856  1015 
med  0.362 0.333 0.318 0.322 0.303 0.278 0.243 0.187 0.190 
OWNERSHIP GROUPS    
Private 
obs.  1420 1271 1258 1182 1265 1258 1170  795  946 
med  0.366 0.337 0.323 0.329 0.306 0.281 0.246 0.191 0.190 
State-controlled  obs.  30 30 32 30 33 32 32 29 32 
med  0.287 0.287 0.250 0.250 0.232 0.222 0.177 0.138 0.150 
Foreign  obs.  19 21 22 25 29 33 36 32 37 
med  0.111 0.175 0.236 0.258 0.239 0.236 0.206 0.177 0.160 
medians  significantly  different     yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
REGION    
Moscow-based banks  obs.  567 570 586 614 643 661 620 357 469 
med  0.378 0.359 0.350 0.354 0.328 0.308 0.275 0.195 0.190 
Regional banks  obs.  588 591 595 598 684 662 618 499 546 
med  0.359 0.315 0.297 0.298 0.284 0.251 0.213 0.182 0.178 
medians significantly different      no yes yes yes yes yes yes no  no 
SIZE CATEGORIES    
Small  
obs.  489 440 436 411 439 439 412 285 338 
med  0.539 0.454 0.434 0.439 0.407 0.381 0.330 0.269 0.280 
Medium-sized   obs.  490 441 438 413 444 442 413 285 338 
med  0.387 0.349 0.306 0.307 0.301 0.281 0.237 0.180 0.190 
Large   obs.  487 438 435 410 441 439 410 283 336 
med  0.235 0.227 0.243 0.259 0.240 0.217 0.182 0.142 0.130 
The Big 3  obs.  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
med  0.112 0.244 0.248 0.254 0.183 0.180 0.128 0.128 0.160 
medians significantly different     yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
DEPOSIT INSURANCE 
SCHEME (DIS)               
Included in DIS  obs.  801 801 802 649 632 
med  0.284 0.255 0.213 0.172 0.162 
Not included in DIS  obs.  419 522 436 207 172 
med  0.367 0.338 0.312 0.258 0.251 
medians significantly different     yes yes yes yes yes 
Note: In order to utilize all the available data, all the indicators are calculated at the end of the first quarter of 
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Table A.3  Loans to assets ratio by bank ownership, location, size and participation in the deposit 
 insurance  scheme 
 
LOANS TO ASSETS RATIO  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
TOTAL SAMPLE  obs.  1469 1326 1313 1238 1331 1326 1238  856  1015 
med  0.481 0.428 0.485 0.521 0.535 0.555 0.582 0.614 0.627 
OWNERSHIP GROUPS                               
Private  obs.  1420 1275 1259 1183 1269 1261 1170  795  946 
med  0.481 0.431 0.491 0.524 0.538 0.556 0.584 0.616 0.628 
State-controlled  obs.  30 30 32 30 33 32 32 29 32 
med  0.431 0.418 0.474 0.520 0.531 0.591 0.594 0.633 0.669 
Foreign  obs.  19 21 22 25 29 33 36 32 37 
med  0.428 0.276 0.257 0.294 0.414 0.309 0.368 0.500 0.495 
medians significantly different      no yes yes yes yes yes no    no  yes 
REGION                               
Moscow-based banks  obs.  567 571 586 615 646 663 620 357 469 
med  0.425 0.401 0.451 0.493 0.496 0.506 0.515 0.550 0.561 
Regional banks  obs.  588 593 595 598 685 663 618 499 546 
med  0.462 0.437 0.505 0.541 0.564 0.596 0.635 0.651 0.659 
medians  significantly  different      yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
SIZE CATEGORIES                               
    Small  obs.  489 442 437 412 443 442 412 285 338 
med  0.503 0.436 0.499 0.496 0.487 0.516 0.554 0.598 0.552 
    Medium-sized  obs.  490 442 438 413 444 442 413 285 338 
med  0.486 0.459 0.479 0.522 0.555 0.578 0.585  0.62  0.631 
    Large   obs.  487 439 435 410 441 439 410 283 336 
med  0.443 0.395 0.478 0.538 0.545 0.568 0.596 0.622 0.671 
    The Big 3  obs.  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
med  0.332 0.363 0.472 0.530 0.437 0.577 0.590 0.495 0.486 
medians significantly different     yes yes no no yes yes no  no yes 
DEPOSIT INSURANCE 
SCHEME                               
    Included in DIS  obs.              801 801 802 649 632 
med           0.556 0.583 0.610 0.631 0.654 
    Not included in DIS  obs.           419 525 436 207 172 
med           0.490 0.497 0.503 0.516 0.595 
medians significantly different                 yes yes yes yes yes 
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Table A.4  Nonperforming loans to total loans by bank ownership, location, size and  
  the deposit insurance scheme 
 
NONPERFORMING LOANS  1999  2000 2001 2002  2003 2004 2005  2006 2007 
TOTAL SAMPLE 
obs.  1423  1275 1265 1181  1280 1277 1226 853 1009 
med 0.019 0.008  0.004  0.003 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.009 0.007 
OWNERSHIP GROUPS                
Private 
obs.  1374  1226 1214 1128  1220 1214 1159 792  940 
med 0.019 0.008  0.004  0.003 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.009 0.007 
State-controlled 
obs.  30  30 31 30  33 32 32  29 32 
med 0.022 0.014  0.005  0.014 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.010 0.008 
Foreign 
obs.  19  19 20 23  27 31 35  32 37 
med 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.001 
medians significantly different  no  yes no yes  yes  yes  yes  no yes 
REGION                
Moscow-based banks 
obs.  537 541 559 575 612 630 608 356 464 
med 0.001 0.000  0.000  0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.009 0.006 
Regional banks 
obs.  575 574 578 582 668 647 618 497 545 
med 0.040 0.018  0.009  0.006 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.009 0.008 
medians  significantly  different  yes  yes yes yes  yes yes yes no yes 
SIZE CATEGORIES                
    Small  
obs.  454 408 403 367 406 406 403 282 333 
med 0.036 0.012  0.008  0.000 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.008 0.005 
    Medium-sized 
obs.  482 432 428 404 436 433 410 285 337 
med 0.011 0.008  0.003  0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.007 0.005 
    Large 
obs.  484 432 431 407 435 435 410 283 336 
med 0.020 0.007  0.003  0.004 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.010 0.009 
    The Big 3 
obs.  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
med 0.149 0.046  0.023  0.027 0.019 0.017 0.015 0.012 0.012 
medians significantly different  yes  no no yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
DEPOSIT INSURANCE                               
    Included in DI  obs.          797  798  802  647  630 
   med        0.005  0.005  0.007  0.008  0.009 
    Not included in DI  obs.          403  419  424  205  172 
   med        0.001  0.001  0.002  0.010  0.005 
medians significantly  different          yes  yes  yes  no  yes 
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Table A.5  Loan loss provisions by bank ownership, location, size and  
  participation in the deposit insurance scheme 
 
LOAN  LOSS  PROVISIONS  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
TOTAL SAMPLE   obs.  1423 1275 1264 1181 1280 1277 1226  853  1009 
med  0.054 0.043 0.030 0.025 0.024 0.025 0.033 0.036 0.038 
OWNERSHIP GROUPS                               
Private  obs.  1374 1226 1213 1128 1220 1214 1159  792  940 
med  0.055 0.043 0.030 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.035 0.038 0.039 
State-controlled  obs.  30 30 31 30 33 32 32 29 32 
med  0.061 0.042 0.025 0.031 0.027 0.022 0.025 0.029 0.032 
Foreign   obs.  19 19 20 23 27 31 35 32 37 
med  0.018 0.037 0.022 0.013 0.015 0.011 0.005 0.011 0.012 
medians significantly different     yes no no yes no no yes yes yes 
REGION                               
Moscow-based banks   obs.  537 541 559 575 612 630 608 356 464 
med  0.025 0.022 0.016 0.018 0.024 0.022 0.039 0.053 0.051 
Regional banks  obs.  575 574 578 582 668 647 618 497 545 
med  0.081 0.063 0.038 0.030 0.025 0.026 0.030 0.030 0.032 
medians significantly different    yes yes yes yes no  no yes yes yes 
SIZE CATEGORIES                               
    Small   obs.  454 408 403 367 406 406 403 282 333 
med  0.068 0.056 0.032 0.018 0.017 0.019 0.028 0.030 0.039 
    Medium-sized  obs.  482 432 428 404 436 433 410 285 337 
med  0.038 0.037 0.027 0.025 0.023 0.021 0.030 0.036 0.037 
    Large  obs.  484 432 430 407 435 435 410 283 336 
med  0.057 0.043 0.030 0.030 0.031 0.032 0.042 0.042 0.039 
    The Big 3  obs.  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
med  0.199 0.090 0.067 0.060 0.054 0.061 0.037 0.037 0.036 
medians significantly different    yes yes no yes yes yes yes yes no 
DEPOSIT INSURANCE 
SCHEME                               
    Included in DIS  obs.              797  797  802  647  630 
med              0.026  0.027  0.031  0.032  0.036 
    Not included in DIS  obs.              403  480  424  206  172 
med              0.021  0.021  0.042  0.066  0.059 
medians significantly different                 yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
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Table A.6  Liquidity ratio by bank ownership, location, size and  
  participation in the deposit insurance scheme 
 
LIQUIDITY RATIO  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
TOTAL SAMPLE 
obs.  1469 1326 1311 1238 1331 1326 1238  856  1015 
med  0.236 0.301 0.291 0.283 0.284 0.281 0.256 0.222 0.220 
OWNERSHIP GROUPS             
Private  
obs.  1420 1275 1257 1183 1269 1261 1170  795  946 
med  0.231 0.299 0.287 0.279 0.276 0.278 0.255 0.221 0.220 
State-controlled 
obs. 30 30 32 30 33 32 32 29 32 
med  0.334 0.328 0.315 0.325 0.296 0.269 0.224 0.195 0.180 
Foreign 
obs. 19 21 22 25 29 33 36 32 37 
med  0.420 0.590 0.521 0.518 0.429 0.405 0.334 0.230 0.260 
medians significantly different    yes yes yes yes yes yes yes no  no 
REGION             
Moscow-based banks 
obs. 567 571 586 615 646 663 620 357 469 
med  0.279 0.344 0.338 0.321 0.334 0.335 0.322 0.278 0.280 
Regional banks 
obs. 588 593 595 598 685 663 618 499 546 
med  0.259 0.296 0.271 0.258 0.247 0.240 0.201 0.187 0.180 
medians  significantly  different    no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
SIZE CATEGORIES             
    Small 
obs. 489 442 437 412 443 442 412 285 338 
med  0.184 0.249 0.253 0.274 0.281 0.277 0.253 0.234 0.290 
    Medium-sized 
obs. 490 442 437 413 444 442 413 285 338 
med  0.218 0.295 0.289 0.284 0.277 0.291 0.263 0.230 0.220 
    Large 
obs. 487 439 434 410 441 439 410 283 336 
med  0.298 0.370 0.323 0.288 0.288 0.279 0.254 0.200 0.180 
    The Big 3 
obs.  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
med  0.406 0.283 0.304 0.261 0.354 0.273 0.265 0.230 0.230 
medians significantly  different    yes  yes  yes no no no no no yes 
DEPOSIT INSURANCE (DI)                               
    Included in DI  obs.          801  802  802  649  632 
   med          0.265 0.268 0.226 0.199 0.185 
    Not included in DI  obs.          419  434  436  206  172 
   med          0.316 0.329 0.336 0.315 0.290 
medians significantly different            yes yes yes yes yes 
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Table A.7  Net interest margin to total loans by bank ownership, location, size and  
  participation in the deposit insurance scheme 
 
NET  INTEREST  MARGIN  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
TOTAL SAMPLE 
obs. 1423 1277 1262 1181 1280 1277 1229  761  942 
med 0.023 0.035 0.029 0.036 0.033 0.029 0.028 0.025 0.024
OWNERSHIP GROUPS             
Private  
obs. 1374 1229 1211 1129 1221 1214 1161  709  878 
med 0.023 0.036 0.030 0.036 0.033 0.029 0.028 0.025 0.024
State-controlled 
obs.  30 29 31 30 33 32 32 25 32 
med 0.042 0.046 0.034 0.041 0.030 0.024 0.023 0.018 0.020
Foreign 
obs.  19 19 20 22 26 31 36 27 32 
med 0.016 0.015 0.016 0.013 0.014 0.012 0.013 0.017 0.020
medians  significantly  different    yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
REGION             
Moscow-based banks  
obs.  537 544 560 575 612 630 611 311 434 
med 0.014 0.020 0.018 0.028 0.026 0.025 0.028 0.025 0.026
Regional banks 
obs.  575 574 578 583 668 647 618 450 508 
med 0.046 0.053 0.040 0.044 0.038 0.032 0.027 0.024 0.023
medians significantly different    yes yes yes yes yes yes no  no yes 
SIZE CATEGORIES             
Small 
obs.  454 411 405 368 406 406 406 246 286 
med 0.040 0.053 0.040 0.048 0.047 0.039 0.036 0.032 0.032
Medium-sized  
obs.  482 431 425 403 436 433 410 263 327 
med 0.030 0.039 0.031 0.036 0.032 0.029 0.028 0.023 0.024
Large 
obs.  484 433 429 407 435 435 410 249 326 
med 0.016 0.024 0.024 0.029 0.027 0.024 0.023 0.021 0.019
The Big 3 
obs.  3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
med 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.021 0.015 0.014 0.017 0.018 0.014
medians  significantly  different    yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEME             
Included in DIS 
obs.  777 778 785 733 797 799 802 587 694 
med 0.033 0.040 0.035 0.038 0.033 0.029 0.026 0.024 0.022
Not included in DIS 
obs.  349 347 356 355 403 418 424 173 217 
med 0.023 0.028 0.024 0.033 0.031 0.029 0.031 0.028 0.029
medians significantly different    yes yes yes yes yes no yes yes yes 
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Table A.8  Variable description 
 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
Size  total assets, mln.RUB 
Capitalization  ratio of equity to total assets  
Loans to assets  ratio of total loans (to nonfinancial clients) to total assets 
Nonperforming loans  ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans 
Loan loss provisions  ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans 
Liquidity ratio  ratio of liquid assets to total assets 
Loans to individuals  ratio of loans to individuals to total loans 
Net interest margin 
the difference between interest income from loans to customers and 
interest expense paid on customer deposits as a proportion of total 
loans 
Credit growth  annual change in loans to nonfinancial clients 
Oil price  average export price for crude oil for preceding quarter ($ per ton), 
Rosstat 
GDP growth  quarterly growth of real GDP, Rosstat 
DUMMY VARIABLES    
Foreign bank  100% foreign owned bank as reported quarterly by the CBR 
State-controlled bank  bank included in the list of state banks by Vernikov (2007) 
Moscow bank  bank's headquarters are located in Moscow 
Big 3  three largest banks by assets: Sberbank, VTB and Gazprombank 
Deposit insurance system  bank entered DIS before the end of the first quarter of 2005 
REGULATION RATIOS    
N1 - capital adequacy ratio 
bank's equity capital to the overall risk-weighted assets minus the 
sum of the reserves created for the depreciation of securities and 
possible losses 
N2 - quick liquidity ratio  sum of the bank's highly liquid assets to the sum of the bank's liabil-
ities on demand accounts 
N3 - current liquidity ratio  sum of the bank's liquid assets to the sum of the bank's liabilities on 
demand account and accounts up to 30 days 
N7 - maximum large credit risk 
percentage of the total amount of large credit risks (which is the sum 
of the bank's risk-weighted claims to one borrower) in the bank's 
equity capital 
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